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ARE WE LOSING TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS?

1. Introduction

A vision of Europe had a very important role during the dramatic dissolution of the socialist system of former Yugoslavia. The perception that being a part of Yugoslavia was an obstacle to European integration where Slovenia and Croatia “naturally” belonged was one of the motives in abandoning Croatia’s affiliation to the former Yugoslavia. This article will not revisit the deep historical reasons, immediate causes of the conflict involved in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It will analyse the perceptions of Croatia’s political elites and of the broader population in the critical days of the breakdown of the former state.

The last party congress of the League of Communists of Slovenia was held under the motto “Europe Now”. The affiliation with European cultural milieu implicitly and explicitly meant that the western parts of the former state (Slovenia and Croatia) were perceived as much more European than the eastern parts of Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia presented the possibility of merging and integrating with Europe and actually becoming part of their “natural” environment (Sekulić, 1997; 2001).

The perception of affiliation and trust in Europe followed a zigzag path. On the one hand, there was an expression of gratitude to Germany and Vatican for recognizing Croatia’s independent statehood. On the other hand, there was disappointment in other Western Europe countries for not intervening when Croatia was exposed to Serbia’s

aggression. This disappointment was partly the result (Sekulić, 2001) of the lack of comprehension and understanding by a part of the Croatian public that the values underlying European integration were permeated by tolerance which, in turn, was founded on antifascism. The unification of Europe was based on the idea of avoiding conflicts arising in a fragmented Europe composed of mutually confronted national states. The last ideological inspiration for such a trans-European and then also global conflict had been Nazism and fascism (Grubiša, 2005). Croatian public opinion was split because a large portion of the desire to abandon communism and join Europe was based on the reaffirmation of the puppet regime from World War II and a revival of ethnic nationalism. European unification, however, is based on anti-nationalism, anti-fascism and promotion of tolerance. Such an orientation of dominant actors of the European policy was not based a framework that would eagerly accept a regime that was, to say the least, ambivalent when it came to those values. A process of “sobering” took place in Croatia, whereby a distinction was finally made between anti-communism and nationalism and it was realised that xenophobia was not an acceptable ideological framework for “entering Europe”.¹ The differentiation between anti-communism and nationalism has continued until today. It is no longer based on disappointment and inadequate European support for Croatia’s struggle for independence from Yugoslavia and its efforts to defend itself from aggression but on the pressure and getting even with the remaining xenophobic elements that started during the ravages of war.

This can be seen in various reactions to the requests to prosecute for war crimes committed during Homeland War. Some people in Croatia perceive Europe as the source of pressure to sacrifice the high-

¹ This does not mean that xenophobia does not exist in Europe and that there are no nationalistic parties. They do not lend any such note to Europe and are certainly not the forces which would push countries towards European integration. When such political forces manage to get their places in governments, the „united Europe“ reacts (the case of Austria and Heider). It is also impossible that non-democratic regimes may be accepted as integral parts of Europe (support to the “orange revolution” or the rejection of Lukasenko). The same logic was applied when Croatia was practically isolated in the last period of Tudjman’s regime.

est values of the Croatian fight and to re-establish Yugoslavia, or as an entity which “punishes” Croatia for the dissolution of Yugoslavia or as an entity that characterizes Croatia’s war of liberation was a criminal enterprise. Others perceive EU pressure as a positive method used by a foreign ally to contain the re-awakened ethno-nationalism and xenophobia that erupted in these territories with the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Therefore, the first dimension which characterises the attitude towards Europe is an interaction between the historical perception of affiliation “to the European cultural milieu” and a very specific conduct by some European countries towards Croatia in the course of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, during the war and the constitution of the Croatian State. Some manifestations of such an attitude started when they failed to firmly condemn Milošević’s encroaching upon Croatian territories and lasted until the establishment of The Hague Tribunal. How have these different components impacted the relationship towards Europe under the influence of value orientations by individuals and groups?

If value determinations are governed by a nationalistic discourse and the value of independence is above all other values, then questioning the actions and operations which led to the country’s independence must be experienced as unjustified and Europe is criticised externally just like so-called ‘Yugonostalgics’ are criticised internally. On the other hand, those who cherish democracy and economic prosperity as the highest values, consider such pressures and Europe itself as an ally in the struggle to transform Croatia according to contemporary values they advocate.²

² The question here is whether Croatia is a „goal“ or a „value in itself?“ An independent Croatia may be a value *per se* and it is then less important „what kind of Croatia“ it is going to be because the most important fact is its independence. An independent Croatia may be an instrumental value aimed at developing a more democratic and prosperous society. There is no inherent controversy between these two goals, but a problem arises when they are in conflict. Those who have the highest regard for independence and do not care for a democratic content must be irritated by constant nagging about how some democratic goals have not been achieved. On the contrary, those who believe that independence is only a means to prosperity and democracy, experience Europe as an ally

Apart from this historical dimension, another dimension that must be taken into account is the economic one. Croatia has not yet come out of the labour pains of transition. Generally speaking, Croatia's gross domestic product today is equivalent to that of the 1980's. (Družić, 2005). The period from 1980 to 1990 was a period of stagnation, and then, because of the war and transition, there was a dramatic fall which lasted until 1993. Then, an anaemic growth took place and, with some oscillations, lasted until today. This growth has brought Croatia to the levels prior to the break-up of former Yugoslavia in 1990, after a decade of stagnation.

At the same time a period of extensive restructuring of the ownership system with strong elements of political redistribution and the strengthening of criminal elements happened. In addition, this was a period of deindustrialisation (in 2004, the index of industrial production amounted to 78% of the 1990 index with an employment index in industry of 39%). This evolution is not the result of a normal transformation towards a post-industrial society but an abrupt closing up of uncompetitive industry on the one hand and of a speculative sale of houses and lands on the other, but also of a monetary policy which has not focused on domestic production but has encouraged import. The service sector was not growing fast enough to absorb those who have lost their jobs in industry. The total number of the employed in 1999 was 1,568,000 and in 2004, it was 1,392,000. The total number of the unemployed in 1990 amounted to 161,000, and in 2004, it was 310,000. It is therefore clear that Croatia has not got over its transitional "labour pains" and that a social differentiation has set in where there is a number of those who have successfully engaged in the new transformed economy but also those who live much worse than in the time prior to 1990.

The global financial crisis has inexorably affected Croatia, exposing the weaknesses in the pattern of development that left problems unresolved and increased state debts. In a situation where capital is

which is pushing Croatia towards the realisation of the same goals. Other combinations are also possible, such as democracy or autocracy without independence. Those who advocate "independence at any cost" accuse those who focus on the content (openness, democratic qualities) and not only on the form (independence).

becoming more and more expensive on the global market, the present model has proved to have been unsustainable, with consequences such as unemployment and the unavoidable tightening of the public sector. This has led to the deepening of social differentiation and the division of society into losers (majority) and winners (minority). In May 2010, registered unemployment amounted to 17.1% (according to analysts from the agency *Moj Posao*). Increased social differentiation in a situation of overall crisis has become even more striking and, in people's daily perception, it is usually related to capitalism, globalisation, and opening up to the rest of the world. Due to the fact that Europe is an exponent of capitalism, globalisation and opening up which resulted in the erosion of living standards and social security for large groups of people, there is an additional independent component that affects how people perceive Europe.

In 1990, the perception of Europe in Croatia was connected with the promised cultural milieu it wanted to enter but was prevented from doing so because of the fact that it belonged to former Yugoslavia. The European accession meant prosperity and democracy. After the war and a tepid European (non)intervention, after the experience with The Hague Tribunal and a constant threat of a "West-Balkan Association" and after the economic catastrophe also ascribed to the economic opening and the incursion of the European capital (Croatian banks are in foreign hands, the coastline property is sold to foreigners, industry is disappearing, etc.), a positive picture of Europe as a cultural circle Croatia wants to belong to, which is its democratic option and a guarantor of economic prosperity has faded and is substituted by a much darker perspective.

This has been a general framework for research and the interpretation of results connected with the trust in the European Union as compared to trust in domestic institutions. This trust is on the one hand under the influence of the general historical context and the current strong consensus by political elites that it is Croatia's goal to enter the European Union. To what extent is this consensus reached by the Government, opposition, the President of the Republic and all other actors also shared by other citizens? Does such a historical context lead to a gap between political elites and other groups of citizens?

This research does not concentrate on the citizens' agreement or disagreement regarding Croatia's accession to the European Union. We already know from surveys of public opinion that the support to the accession is melting away (Baranović 2002, Ilišin 2002, Gfk Croatia 2006). It can also be assumed that people may have trust in institutions but for some other reasons they may not want Croatia to join the European Union. The opposite is also possible: a citizen may not trust European institutions but still advocate accession. In our research, we shall concentrate on this deeper version of trust and on the trust in Europe as opposed to the expressed trust in other, "domestic" institutions.

Another dimension that is subject to this analysis is the level of trust in "domestic" institutions. This serves as a good indicator of the consensus and satisfaction with the existing regime as well as an indication of who is "blamed" or responsible for the current situation. Trust in institutions is primarily studied through the theoretical dimensions of "social capital" (Putnam 1995, and Putnam and Gross 2002). It is part of culture, a characteristic of every society which shows in a very specific way how people in that society have organised their lives and activities. Social capital is operationalised through three dimensions: the value system which regulates the conduct of an individual and the selection of options, the system of interpersonal relations and links which enable a better functioning of society in all its dimensions (Coleman, 1988) and a system of norms and trust in social institutions. According to the World Bank definition, "social capital refers to institutions, relations and norms which determine the quality and quantity of social interactions. . . . Social capital is not only the sum total of all institutions in society, but also a social glue that keeps them together" (Office of the National Statistics, 2001). Trust in institutions is very important for the functioning of society because it shows the level of citizens' satisfaction but also their readiness to satisfy their needs and engage in regular activities through domestic institutions. The extent to which citizens avoid using domestic institutions or resort to other forms of social interaction may reflect a very low level of trust.

The main characteristic of the communist system was the fact that its institutions were designed according to a “top-down” model where it was sufficient to have an institutional design for society to function properly. An answer to very clear manifestations of dysfunctionality of such a design was the introduction of new reforms but again in a “top-down” manner which was only an improvement of the already existing ideological design (Yugoslavia had a new Constitution every 10 years). In this way, Croatian society had undergone endless changes which were not products of normal evolving processes of development and the result of gradual adaptation but were the outcome of an ideological design which was often contrary to social reality (Šporer, 2004). Due to the fact that institutional changes did not occur in a “bottom-up” manner, as products of an interaction of economic, technological and social changes, society was exposed to constant “revolutionising” because the new institutional reforms had been introduced by a “top-down” method. Indeed, the institutions were not accepted as a natural part of society helping it to function better and helping its citizens to satisfy their needs but more as an “alien body” imposed from above or from the outside and therefore it had to be avoided and bypassed. The consequences led to the instability of the system because the institutions were not accepted as something stable or permanent. Social norms were ignored because they were accepted as unrealistic and governed by ideology. As a result, public trust in domestic institutions was very low. Informal relations and connections provided the only social stability for the average citizen. The question whether those informal social networks had been positive or negative for development after 1991, and to what extent they determined some of its dimensions is an extremely interesting issue. They had been the result of instability of the system and had enabled the continued functioning of a dysfunctional ideological design. They have thus determined long-term perception and trust, but also the level of functioning of institutions in particular those that are the backbone of the market and democracy (Šporer, 2004). The institutions that were less exposed to “bottom down” changes most probably enjoy greater trust.

2. Research design

The primary question of the research was to establish the level of trust in European institutions in relation to other institutions and how interrelated is the trust in various domestic institutions? The second step was to establish whether the patterns of trust in institutions can be explained by value orientations of individuals, their social and demographic position and the change in that position during the process of transition? Third, can we detect any changes in the level of trust in domestic or foreign institutions measured in 2004 and 2010, and if such changes exist, how can they be explained?

Sample

Both surveys have included a representative sample of adult citizens. The 2004 sample has 1250 respondents and their number for 2010 is 1002. The first survey was carried out within the South Eastern Europe Social Survey Program (SEESSP) in coordination with Tromsø University in Norway. The field work was carried out by the agency PULS at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004. For a better understanding of the context, it is necessary to emphasise that the research coincided with parliamentary elections in Croatia, at which the coalition headed by the SDP lost out to HDZ, which came to power (led by Ivo Sanader). The 2010 survey was carried out as part of research programme conducted by the Institute for Social Research from Zagreb, as part of the project called “Social Stratification and Values in Croatian Society”. The field work was done by the agency “Hendal” in April 2010, after the presidential elections and at the height of the financial and economic crisis that is still wrenching Croatia.

Hypotheses

- Citizens express different levels of trust in institutions.
- Trust in institutions is closely connected with a citizen’s values.

- Trust in institutions is connected with the social status. Persons with a higher socio-economic status (for example, a higher level of education and more income) profit more from the opening of the country and connecting with other knowledge-based societies will have more trust in the European Union than those having lower positions. This hypothesis came about as a result of a larger number of research projects that showed in the process of transition, the so-called “losers” were much more against European integration than the “winners” who had a more positive attitude (Tucker, Pacek, Berinsky, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Szczerbiak, 2001).
- Trust in the European Union is a separate dimension of trust in institutions and is not directly linked with the trust in domestic institutions.
- Trust in the European Union is more connected with the modernistic-democratic values but the trust in traditional institutions (such as the church or the military) is related with to traditional values.
- Generally, trust in institutions is subject to changes resulting from historical and economic events. Trust in domestic institutions in 2010 is going to be different from that in 2004 because of the impact of financial crisis, a series of corruption scandals and arrests that follow the unexplained resignation of Ivo Sanader.

Dependent and independent variables

A dependent variable is the question of trust in institutions.

The question was formulated as follows: “I shall now read to you a list of institutions existing in society and you will tell me how much trust you have in each of them according to the categories listed on this card”. There were four degrees of trust from which to choose: I have a lot of trust; I have quite a lot of trust; I have little trust; I don’t trust at all; I do not know. The institutions that were subjects to citi-

zens' trust were the following: the church, the military, the judiciary, the press, the television, trade unions, police, the Government, the Parliament, political parties, the European Union and, the United Nations. "I don't know" responses were exempted from any further analysis.

Formation of value scales

Respondent's values were treated as independent variables by which to test what had affected citizens' trust in institutions. The formed value scales were based on an exploratory factorisation of a large number of questions indicating different value orientations. Although the dependent variable (trust in institutions) in both the 2004 and 2010 surveys were the same, the value elements were different and therefore the applied value scales were also different. In 2004, we started with 76 questions. A component analysis reduced those 76 elements to 20 basic components. Some of the components were used to construct the value scale. The actual scales are given in the appendix. The name of each scale and its alpha value is shown below (the cases where we increased alpha by leaving out particular elements are not given). Only the final version of the scale is given here. All scales are of the Likert type using five grades whereby value 1 means "I fully disagree" and value 5 "I fully agree":

The value scales (**2004**) are the following:

Scale of egalitarianism (alpha=.793)

Scale of gender conservatism (alpha=.816)

Scale of the approval of privatisation (alpha=.735)

Scale of patriotism (alpha=.770)

Scale of democratic qualities (alpha=.565)

Scale of political authoritarianism (alpha=.695)

Scale of syndicalism (alpha=.690)

Scale of corruption (alpha=.838)

Scale of sexual norms (alpha=.684)

Scale of interethnic relations (ethnocentrism) (alpha=.710)

- Scale of sexual norms II (alpha=.620)
- Scale of modernism (alpha=.583)
- Scale of general authoritarianism (alpha=.310)

The 2010 value scales were developed using the same approach. There with 69 statements that underwent a process of factorisation. The resulting components were used to develop value scales that were subjected to a reliability test. Below are the obtained scales and alpha reliability values for each scale.

- The value scales (**2010**) are the following:
- Scale of authoritarian statism (alpha=.886)
 - Scale of gender authoritarianism (alpha=.838)
 - Scale of authoritarian national traditionalism (alpha=.783)
 - Scale of patriotic exclusivism (alpha=.753)
 - Scale of political authoritarianism (alpha=.596)
 - Scale of isolationism (alpha=.632)
 - Scale of national lack of pride (alpha=.699)
 - Scale of threat coming from the world (alpha=.624)
 - Scale of private ownership orientation (alpha=.592)
 - Scale of modernism in gender relations (alpha=.549)

Formation of scales of the socio-demographic-economic status

The other group of independent variables by which we tried to explain citizens' trust in institutions were socio-demographic-economic characteristics which we grouped in the following way (a detailed content of variables given in the appendix): occupational position, education, place of residence, income.

3. Results

a) *Trust in institutions*

The data shows the degree of trust in all institutions based on the 2004 survey.

Table 1. Level of trust in institutions in 2004

Trust in	No trust at all	Little trust	Quite a lot of trust	A lot of trust	Mean	St. Error
Church	9.7%	22.8	44.4	23.1	2.8081	.90080
Military	5.7%	25.6	53.4	15.3	2.7837	.76766
Judiciary	26.3%	49.1	20.9	3.7	2.0193	.78714
Press	20.8%	56.0	21.4	1.7	2.0405	.70036
TV	13.8%	55.6	28.2	2.4	2.1920	.69190
Trade Unions	12.5%	45.1	37.6	4.8	2.3464	.75714
Police	10.8%	35.2	46.3	7.7	2.5099	.78809
Government	19.0%	49.0	28.4	3.5	2.1643	.76731
Parliament	21.4%	48.9	26.2	3.5	2.1186	.77651
Political parties	31.4%	54.5	11.9	2.2	1.8500	.70696
EU	25.6%	40.2	29.2	5.0	2.1360	.85423
UN	21.3%	38.8.	32.6	7.3	2.2589	.87509

The results from the 2004 survey in Table 1 show that trust varies significantly from institution to institution. Using responses in which more than 50% of respondents had ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a lot of trust’ as a rough criterion of significant institutional trust, only the church, the military and the police satisfy this criterion. A little less than 70% of respondents expressed ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a lot of trust’ in the first two institutions, and a little less than 50% in the police.

The institution(s) with the lowest degree of trust were political parties, in which only around 14% of the respondents expressed ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a lot of trust’. Trade unions ranked better because more than 40% expressed trust in them, whereas the percentages

for the Government and Parliament were around 30%. Trust in the European Union (and the UN) was relatively high and higher than that in the Government and Parliament. Grouping all the institutions into a “hierarchy” based on the degree of public trust, the first group (from over 50% up to 70% of those expressing trust) includes the church, the military and the police; the second group includes trade unions and the UN (with a little less than 40% of those expressing trust). The third group includes the Government, Parliament, television and the EU where trust amounted to 30%. The fourth group consists of the judiciary and the press with trust being expressed by a little more than 20% of respondents. Political parties trail all other institutions, with less than 15% of respondents who indicated trust in them.

Generally speaking, the citizens of Croatia express trust in defensive, repressive and spiritual organisations, while the trust in the institutions constituting the backbone of the democratic system is very diverse. Thus the political parties, being an important part of the pluralist system, enjoy extremely low level of citizens’ trust while trade unions, directly involved in the social status issues of the employed, are relatively better ranked by citizens. Levels of trust in the UN and in the European Union are not much higher than trust in domestic institutions, but it should be emphasised that they enjoy more trust than domestic political parties, the judiciary and the press. It must be mentioned here that these results are by no means specific to Croatia. As shown by the results of the Eurobarometer Survey 2001, in most west-European countries the police are an institution in which citizens trust the most. This is the case in countries like Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Austria and Finland, but also in other countries where it ranks very high (Hudson, 2006). The military and the church were not offered as alternatives. The data are not comparable but we can say that people in these countries have more trust in the UN than in the EU, and we can even say that relative trust in the EU (as opposed to other institutions) is higher in Croatia than in most surveyed European countries.

Table 2. Degree of trust in institutions in 2010

Trust in	No trust at all	Little trust	Quite a lot of trust	A lot of trust	Mean	St. error
Church	18.0%	28.8	32.6	20.7	2.5599	1.02025
Military	9.3%	25.1	41.7	23.9	2.8023	.9066
Judiciary	21.9%	45.1	24.5	8.5	2.1955	.87524
Press	17.7%	39.3	35.7	7.3	2.3251	.84892
TV	14.8%	40.0	35.3	9.9	2.4025	.85677
Trade Unions	19.3%	34.0	35.2	11.6	2.3905	.92507
Police	13.1%	28.8	41.5	16.5	2.6147	.91142
Government	32.4%	39.2	23.3	5.1	2.0112	.87316
Parliament	35.5%	39.1	20.5	4.9	1.9478	.86859
Political parties	34.3%	42.5	18.9	4.4	1.9344	.83911
EU	19.9%	39.4	33.9	6.8	2.2766	.85733
UN	18.0%	33.5	38.2	10.2	2.4055	.89816

The degree of public trust in institutions based on the responses from the 2010 survey, has remained more or less the same: the military, the church and the police enjoy the most trust. However, the order of these three institutions has changed: the military now ranks first, and the church has dropped from first to third position. Using the same rough criterion to establish which institutions enjoy the trust of more than 50% of respondents, only these three institutions (65.6% of citizens have trust in the military, 58% in the police, and 53.1% in the church) satisfy this criterion. In fact, there has been a relative decrease in overall trust in institutions because in 2004, more citizens expressed trust in the church and the military than in 2010. (This is not the case with the police, ranking third, which now enjoys a little more trust than was the case in 2004. The police have even left behind the church, enjoying the trust of 58% of respondents, while only 53.1% trust the church. In 2004, the ratio was 67.5% in favour of the church and 54% in favour of the police).

Trade unions, TV, and the press are in the middle of the table enjoying the trust of 40% of citizens (trade unions 46.8%, TV 45.2%, and the press 43%). Then follows the judiciary enjoying the trust of 33% of citizens, with the Government (28.6%), Parliament (25.4%), and political parties at the very bottom of the table with 23.3%. Trust in the UN was expressed by 48.4% of citizens and trust in the EU by 40.7%.

b) A comparison between 2004-2010

Apart from ranking the degree of trust, it is interesting to observe the most significant changes in comparison to what we had six years ago. Which institutions are “the winners” and “the losers” during that period of time? Obvious losers are: the church, the Croatian Government, trade unions, political parties, and the Croatian Parliament. Relative winners are the judiciary and the press. It is obvious that the corruption scandals and the economic crisis have damaged the reputation of major political and government institutions. Those involved in exposing misappropriation (primarily the press and to some extent TV) and in the consequent prosecution thereof (the judiciary) have gained more trust. The decreased public trust in the church can probably be connected to the widely publicized scandals involving the Catholic Church in the world, as well as with the perception that the church has not given up its material privileges, and that it is insulated from the economic crisis in Croatia. The perception (justified) of its close ideological and economic ties with the Croatian Government may now be reflecting on the church in a negative way.

The scope of such changes and the degree of the decline or increase in the trust depends on the criteria we choose to adopt. In order to describe this process in more detail, we shall use general tables of trust from 2004 and 2010, and make a simple comparison between the percentage of citizens who express trust or distrust, and then describe these trends more precisely.

We can first compare the percentage of respondents who expressed a lot of trust or quite a lot of trust in the listed institutions. We are not interested at this point in the absolute rank of the expressed trust in a particular institution, but in the relative magnitude of the decline or the increase in trust in institutions.

Table 3. Institutions in which citizens have less trust in 2010 than in 2004: “Losers”

Institution	% of trust in 2004	% of trust in 2010	Difference
Church	67.5	53.1	-14.4
Parliament	29.7	25.4	-4.3
Government	31.9	28.6	-3.3
Military	68.7	65.6	-3.1

The church is the biggest loser. Although it still enjoys more than 50% of citizens’ trust, it has experienced the largest relative fall. In 2010, 14.4% fewer citizens express trust in it than did in 2004. It is a dramatic fall shows a real shift in public opinion. Smaller shifts of 3 or 4% may still be within a margin of statistical error, but such a significant fall is certainly a reflection of an underlying social process.

Table 4. Institutions in which citizens have more trust in 2010 than in 2004: “Winners”

Institution	% of trust in 2004	% of trust in 2010	Difference
Press	23.1	43.0	19.9
Television	30.6	45.2	14.6
Political parties	14.1	23.3	9.2
UN	39.9	48.4	8.5
Judiciary	24.6	33.0	8.4
EU	34.2	40.7	6.5
Trade Unions	42.4	46.8	4.4
Police	54.0	58.0	4.0

Just like the church is the most obvious loser, the press is the most obvious relative winner since as many as 19.9% more citizens have expressed trust in it than in 2004. A very low level of trust in 2004 of only 23.1% of respondents meant that the press did not catch up with the “uniforms” but got significantly closer to them. The difference in the percentage of those who showed trust in the church and the press in 2004 amounted to 44.4% (67.5% in the church as opposed to 23.1% in the press). In 2010 this difference has fallen by 10.1% (53.1% against 43%). The other media, TV, comes right after the press with a rise from 30.6% to 45.2%. We can therefore say that the press and TV are the biggest relative winners of trust if we compare these two points in time.

Political parties are also relative winners by this criterion. Namely, in 2004 only 14.1% of citizens expressed trust in them and in 2010 that percentage rose to 23.3%. However, due to the fact that they started from such a low level of trust, they could not improve their average position. We shall return to that later. There has also been a significant increase of trust in the UN and the EU (8.5 % and 6.5%, respectively), as well as greater trust in trade unions.

The reverse should be the case at other end of the scale, where there are institutions with a lot of distrust, we should expect a reverse situation: where there is less trust, there is automatically more distrust. Because of technical reasons, low trust examples were omitted from the analysis and this reverse situation is not always visible. We shall deal with this problem later in the text.

In the following table, we simply compare the percentages of respondents in 2004 and 2010 who said they did not have trust in a particular institution. The rise of the percentage of distrust is a negative result in the sense of the value because it means that the respondents have less trust in the institution (a larger number of people say they do not have trust in a particular institution).

Table 5. Institutions in which respondents have less trust in 2010 than in 2004: “Losers”

Institutions	% of distrust in 2004	% of distrust in 2010	Difference
Parliament	21.4	35.5	14.1
Government	19.0	32.4	13.4
Church	9.7	18.0	8.3
Trade Unions	12.5	19.3	6.9
Military	5.7	9.3	3.6
Political parties	31.4	34.3	2.9
Police	10.8	13.1	2.3
TV	13.8	14.8	1.0

If we do not look at the decrease of trust but how the relative distrust has increased, then we see that this is primarily the case with Parliament and the Government, followed by the church. Of all the institutions, the church is the major relative loser of trust. The Government and Parliament are institutions in which active distrust is on a rise. Relatively speaking, distrust in the EU and the judiciary has decreased the most.

Table 6. Institutions in which there is a decrease of distrust: “Winners”.

Institution	% of distrust in 2004	% of distrust in 2010	Difference
EU	25.6	19.9	5.7
Judiciary	26.3	21.9	4.4
UN	21.3	18.0	3.3
Press	20.8	17.7	3.1

Yet another group of institutions are in a somewhat polarised situation. Since we only look at the extremes on the scale (on the positive side, those who express quite a lot of trust or a lot of trust in an institution, and on the negative side, only those who say they do not have trust in an institution), then we omit from our analysis those who have expressed little trust.

In this way, a certain number of institutions comes into a “contradictory” position where trust in them has increased, but also distrust,

so that trust becomes more polarised because the mean is “pushed” towards the positive and negative extremes. The most obvious example is trade unions. There are 4.4% more respondents who have expressed trust in them (an increase from 42.4% to 46%) and at the same time there is an increase of 6.9% of those who have expressed distrust (an increase from 12.5% to 19.3). Trade unions are an institution towards which public opinion has become most polarised because we have a simultaneous increase of trust and distrust in them. Political parties are similarly polarized, having a positive difference of 9.2% and at the same time, 2.9% more citizens expressed distrust in them. The same is the case with the police, having the trust of 4% more citizens, along with 2.3% more of those who express distrust. Even one of the biggest “winners”, TV, shows a 1% increase in those who have expressed distrust.

Finally, we can compare the rankings of trust in institutions in the two surveyed years. We shall no longer look at the relative increase or decrease but compare the entire scales. The main criterion will be the mean of the value where in the process of developing it, we transformed four “categories” of trust (no trust, a little trust, quite a lot of trust, a lot of trust) into numerical values from 1 to 4.

Table 7. A rank-list of trust in institutions in 2004 and 2010

2004			2010		
Rank	Institution	Mean	Rank	Institution	Mean
1	Church	2.8081	1	Military	2.8023
2	Military	2.7837	2	Police	2.6124
3	Police	2.5099	3	Church	2.5599
4	Trade Unions	2.3464	4	UN	2.4055
5	UN	2.2589	5	TV	2.4025
6	TV	2.1920	6	Trade Unions	2.3905
7	Government	2.1643	7	Press	2.3251
8	EU	2.1360	8	EU	2.2766
9	Parliament	2.1186	9	Judiciary	2.1995
10	Press	2.0405	10	Government	2.0112
11	Judiciary	2.0193	11	Parliament	1.9478
12	Political parties	1.8500	12	Political parties	1.9344

A change in rank may be tricky because of small differences in the mean; however, it shows the main directions of the changes. The Government experienced the largest “fall” because it fell from seventh to tenth position. The church’s rank fell from 1 to 3, trade unions from 4 to 6 and Parliament from 9 to 11.

The biggest increase in rank was that of the press (which rose from 10 to 7). The judiciary’s ranking also moved two places (from 11 to 9); and the military (from 2 to 1), the police (from 3 to 2) and the UN (from 5 to 4) all by only one place. Qualitatively, trust in Parliament experienced the biggest change. In 2004, the mean for this institution was 2.1186 (a little above the point of “a little trust” (2)). In 2010, the mean for Parliament has fallen below the point of “a little trust” (1.9478). In the absolute sense this is a small decline. In the qualitative sense the decline is big because it means that the average evaluation has moved from the area above “a little trust” to the area below it.

Summing up the results of Croatia’s public trust in institutions, a significant shift of trust in some institutions is evident. The shift is caused by the economic crisis, particularly the social crisis connected with the discovery of society being permeated by corruption. The trust in institutions decreases because they are perceived as generators of, or inefficient fighters against, corruption (the Government, Parliament) or as institutions closely connected with the Government (like the church, for example). The decrease in trust has not affected trust in the military and the police. On the other hand, trust in institutions perceived as those which have contributed to the exposure of corruption (primarily the media and the judiciary) has also increased.

When analysing trust in various institutions from different angles, we cannot say that a general decrease in trust in institutions has occurred. In other words, many institutions have lost citizens’ trust, but others have gained it. If we sum up the percentages of those gaining a lesser “quantity” of trust (the church, the military, the Government and Parliament), then we see that the total loss of trust amounts to 23.1%. On the contrary, if we add up the institutions which have gained more trust: the judiciary, the press, TV, the trade unions, the police, political parties, the EU and the UN, then the “gain” is much

more, 75.5%. This is so because of a relatively large increase of trust in the press and in TV.

However, we also have a simultaneous increase of those who express more distrust in institutions. If we add up the percentages of all institutions in which the trust has increased (the church, the military, TV, the trade unions, the police, the Government, Parliament and political parties), then it amounts to 51.6%. On the other hand, if we add up the decrease of the proportion of those who have expressed distrust in institutions (the judiciary, the press, the EU and the UN), we arrive at 16.2%. The fact that the number of those whose trust in institutions has increased and the same has happened with the percentage of those who have expressed distrust, points to the increase of differentiation and polarisation in the evaluation of institutions. Since the positive shift is larger than the negative one (we have a positive shift of 75.5% as opposed to a negative one of 51.6%), it is clear that trust in institutions in 2010 (on average) is even somewhat greater than in 2004.

In the absolute sense, trust in “uniforms” is still dominant, but the church has lost the primacy it had in 2004. Trust in basic institutions (the Government and Parliament) which had already been relatively low, became even lower. The biggest relative leap happened in the case of the media and the judiciary while opinions about trade unions have become extremely polarised.

International organisations have also experienced an increase of trust. The EU ranks 8th in the rankings of 12 institutions (with a somewhat greater average increase in trust from 2.1360 in 2004 to 2.2766 in 2010). The difference is even more dramatic when we look at the percentage of the public who express trust in the EU (which has increased from 34.2% in 2004 to 40.7% in 2010) and the decreased percentage of the public who express distrust in this institution (from 25.6% in 2004 to 19.9% in 2010).

Finally, if we develop a synthetic table of relative losers and winners by adding up negative and positive shifts, i.e. how much less trust there is now as opposed to 2004, together with a shift in the direction of how many more respondents express distrust, we get the following results:

Table 8. A relative losers and winners of citizens' trust in 2010 as opposed to 2004.

Institution	Total "gain" or "loss" of trust
Church	-22.7
Parliament	-18.4
Government	-16.7
Military	- 6.7
Trade Unions	- 2.3
Police	+ 1.7
Political parties	+ 6.3
UN	+11.8
EU	+12.2
Judiciary	+13.2
TV	+13.6
Press	+23.0

Table 8 points to the conclusion that the biggest relative shift of trust is in the church. Regardless of the fact that the church still enjoys a high level of trust (it has declined from 1st place to 3rd) when expressed by the index of change, the relative decrease of trust in the church is the largest. The two leading institutions (the church and the military), which have swapped places at the top of the scale have actually experienced a relative decrease in trust but the increase of trust in other institutions is not so great that the two institutions were removed from the top of the index. The police is the only institution that has enjoyed an increase in trust and remains at the top of the scale. The Government and Parliament follow the church in the relative decrease in trust. The biggest winner is the press, followed by the judiciary and TV at a distance.

c) Believers and trust in the church

When interpreting the decrease of trust in the church, an alternative interpretation comes to mind. Is the decrease of trust conditioned

by the fact that people have become less religious, and religion and trust in the church are connected? In order to answer this question, we must first see whether piety has gone down in that period of time. The answer is negative. There has been no indication that during the period of six years piety has gone down. A single indicator, such as going to church, shows that no major changes have occurred.

Table 9. How often do you go to church?

	2004	2010
Never	25.5%	20.5%
Only on important holidays	42.1%	44.9%
Once a month	19.5%	18.4%
Once a week	12.5%	15.9%
Every day	0.4%	0.3%

If anything, the percentage of people who go to church is larger and not smaller (there are 5% fewer people who never go to church and 3.4% more of those who go every week). This difference is too small to be described as a significant change. The next question is, has trust in the church decreased among all categories of believers? Is distrust greater among those who do not go to church or those who regularly attend religious services? If this is how we formulate our question, we get to very interesting conclusions.

Table 10. The frequency of church attendance and trust in the Church in 2004

Going to church	No trust	A little trust	Quite a lot of trust	A lot of trust	N
Never	31.3%	29.9%	28.9%	9.9%	284
On important holidays	4.1%	29.2%	50.5%	16.4%	469
Monthly	2.8%	16.1%	52.1%	30.4%	217
Weekly	1.4%	5.0%	42.4%	51.1%	139
Every day	0	25%	25%	50%	4
Total					1113

Table 11. The frequency of church attendance and trust in the Church in 2010

Going to church	No trust	A little trust	Quite a lot of trust	A lot of trust	N
Never	54.6%	27.8%	13.9%	3.6%	194
On important holidays	12.3%	37.3%	36.3%	14.2%	424
Monthly	2.3%	24.1%	42.5%	31.0%	174
Weekly	3.3%	12.7%	34.7%	49.3%	150
Every day	0	0	33.3%	33.7%	3
Total					945

Trust in the church has decreased in all categories, but is greater among those who attend church only rarely or on important holidays. In 2004, the church enjoyed a significant level of trust with persons who rarely attended services. The percentages of those who never went to church were the following: 38.8% did have trust and 31.3% did not. In 2010, the proportion of those who did not have trust rose to 54.6%. In 2004, we could say that with those who never went to church, trust was still divided into thirds. One third did not have trust, one third had a little trust, and one third had quite a lot of trust.

In 2010, more than a half of those who do not go to church do not have trust in it, and the percentage of those who have a lot of trust fell to only 17.6%. Generally speaking, in 2004 those who did not go to church had trust in it but in 2010 this is no longer the case. The same trend, although to a lesser extent, can be seen with people who go to church only on important holidays. As many as 66.9% had quite a lot of trust and a lot of trust in 2004, and in 2010 it fell to 50.5%. On the opposite scale, only 4.1% did not have trust in the church in 2004, and in 2010, the proportion increased three times and amounted to 12.3%. Even among respondents who go to church several times a week, the proportion of those who have quite a lot of trust or a lot of trust in the church, decreased from 93.5% in 2004 to 84% in 2010. The number of respondents in this category who do not have trust in the church increased from 1.4% in 2004 to 3.3% in 2010.

Therefore, the decrease in trust in the church is not caused by the decrease of piety because people go to church as much as they used to, if not more. However, regardless of the frequency of their attendance, trust in the church decreases in all categories, although we can say that it decreases more with those who do not go. This shows that the church, which used to have a positive reputation, even among those who were not believers and did not go to church regardless of their faith, was now beginning to lose this general reputation. Although it does not directly follow from the data, we would say that the moral capital the church derived from its position of organised opposition during communism is not as great now because of its links with the Government. The loss of trust is happening must faster in the case of those who only have a peripheral contact with the church. It is more difficult for believers to lose trust, but non-believers or less dedicated believers who used to have trust in it, are now losing it.

d) Patterns of trust

We formulated a hypothesis stating that trust in Europe had been separated as an independent dimension in relation to the trust in domestic institutions. We shall address that question by using the factor analysis technique. As the first step, to facilitate reference, we want to show a table of inter-correlations.

Table 12. Person's coefficient of the correlation of trust in different institutions 2004

Institutions	Military	Judiciary	Press	TV	Trade Unions	Police	Government	Parliament	Political parties	EU	UN
Church	.479	.249	.117	.186	.184	.214	.212	.225	.235	.069	.121
Military	1	.319	.187	.259	.263	.368	.309	.298	.295	.127	.120
Judiciary		1	.360	.350	.349	.406	.463	.443	.401	.320	.283
Press			1	.695	.352	.283	.303	.313	.301	.322	.262
TV				1	.416	.361	.377	.356	.305	.318	.285
Trade Unions					1	.414	.373	.333	.314	.312	.316
Police						1	.514	.476	.346	.287	.275
Government							1	.829	.592	.397	.360
Parliament								1	.626	.386	.381
Political parties									1	.381	.320
EU										1	.762

Note: All coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level (a 2-tailed test) except for the correlation between the trust in the church and the trust in the EU, which is significant at the 0.05 level.

All coefficients are positive and statistically significant. A cursory study of the table reveals large differences in coefficients i.e. in the level of correlation.

The correlation between the trust in the Government and Parliament is .829. and the correlation between the trust in the European Union and the church is .069. If we look at institution by institution and begin with the church, we shall see the highest correlation with the trust in the military of .479, and the lowest with the EU. The trust in the military (except with the trust in the church) shows relatively high correlations with the trust in the police. On the other hand, we can see that there is correlation of only .12 between the trust in the UN and the trust in the church and the military, while the correlation between the trust in the UN and the European Union is .76.

Various levels of correlation suggest that we should try to find some regular pattern of correlation, i.e. to see whether there are any tendencies that an individual, having expressed a lot of trust in one institution tends to express the same level of trust in other institutions, and that the trust in other institutions may vary in all directions.

Rating rather than ranking was used to identify patterns because rating makes it possible for the respondents to express their trust in all institutions. Ranking (for example, constructing questions like ‘which institution do you trust most’) would result in a different distribution of answers. As Inglehart says “It is true that what people like most is both to have their cake and to eat it – and that is not a problem when there is no need for a choice” (Inglehart, 1997:115). Inglehart’s remark refers to the choice from among different policies when it is realistic that we have to make a choice or to set our priorities. In our case of trust in institutions, an individual is not forced to determine his or her priorities, i.e. trust is not a limited good. Trust in one institution does not exclude trust in another institution. Rating thus constitutes a realistic “imitation of life”. The existence of positive correlations derives from the fact that there is a possibility of positive rating (expressing trust) of several institutions.³

³ A substantive interpretation of the existence of positive correlations may be a tendency that those who express their trust in one institution, express the same tendency (trust)

The most appropriate analytical technique that can be applied to prove or disprove this hypothesis is factor analysis. Factor analysis reveals clusters, (tendencies that the responses to particular questions (in this case on trust in institutions) vary and that they together build clusters of mutually connected types of trust). A component analysis shows how trust in different institutions is grouped. For example, a component analysis will reveal if someone who has a high degree of trust in institution X, will also have a high degree of trust in institutions Y and Z. A high degree of trust in institution X is cannot be used to prediction anything in terms of trust in institutions A and B. The primary reason a component analysis is performed is because to identify patterns of combed trust in different institutions.

Table 13. Factor Analysis – Rotated Component Matrix (a) 2004

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
Church	.057	.038	.023	.755
Military	.116	.156	.098	.768
Judiciary	.214	.506	.122	.327
Press	.125	.878	.134	.018
TV	.252	.809	.062	.088
Trade Unions	.054	.402	.225	.266
Police	.365	.204	.096	.546
Government	.895	.186	.113	.168
Parliament	.883	.197	.149	.179
Political parties	.649	.200	.411	.090
EU	.212	.172	.907	.080
UN	.178	.146	.913	.107

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

in other institutions. In other words, there are differences among people with respect to the overall quantity of expressed trust. It means that respondents could be classified by the overall quantity (larger or smaller) of trust they have in a particular institution. Although this is a very interesting course of action for research, this analysis has not been performed for this article. (see a discussion on this in Sekulić-Šporer, 2006).

A factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis) (Table 13) indicates that there are four groups of components of combined trust in institutions. In such a way, we also test the hypothesis that trust in the European Union (and in the UN, although we are not interested in it at this point) constitutes a separate dimension as opposed to the trust in domestic institutions. This hypothesis is confirmed because, as we can see from Table 13, the trust in the EU and the UN is grouped as a separate independent component (component 3).

Trust in domestic institutions is not homogenous and it is also grouped in three different components. The first group indicates that the respondents in the 2004 survey tended to evaluate their trust in the Government, Parliament and in political parties equally. Although this component is called 'trust in the Government', it actually reflects the respondents' trust in the key institutions of the political system. The second component group is called 'trust in the media' because it correlates trust in the press and in TV, although they appear together with the trust in trade unions and in the judiciary. However, if we look more closely at column 2 (component 2) in Table 13, we shall see that the "weight" (correlations of an element with the presumed common component connecting this group of elements -statements) for trade unions and the judiciary is significantly lower than that for TV and the press. The third component shows that there is a tendency of joint expression of trust in the church, the military and the police. This component is called 'trust in uniforms'.

These four components served as the basis for the construction of scales. They explained 67,725% of the total variance. We did an alpha test for all groups of statements constituting one component in order to test the reliability of a scale, i.e. whether it would be higher if a statement had been left out. In such a way, we removed some statements in the final version of scales.

The final scales representing dependent variables are the following:

1) The scale of trust in the Government consists of four elements of trust in the Government and Parliament whereby trust in political parties was excluded to increase the reliability of the scale from .867 to .904.

2) The scale of trust in the media consists of the trust in the press, TV, the judiciary and trade unions with the alpha value of .751. If the judiciary and trade unions are eliminated, the scale is more reliable; its alpha value is .821 combining just two institutions, the press and TV.

3) The scale of trust in “uniforms” is so named because it is based on an initially extracted component of trust in the military, the church and the police (whereby a clerical dress is treated as a kind of uniform). The alpha test of the three institutions in the scale is .616. By excluding trust in the police, the alpha value of this scale increases to .643. The final version of the scale is comprised of only two elements, trust in the military and in the church.

4) The scale of trust in the European Union. Here we have ignored the fact that trust in the European Union makes up a common component with the trust in the UN and we have taken the element of trust in the EU as a separate dependent variable.

Thus there were four scales as dependent variables for further analysis: trust in the Government, in the press, in “uniforms” and in the EU.

Repeating the same analysis for the 2010 survey yields the following results:

Table 14. Person’s coefficient of the correlation of trust in different institutions 2010

Institutions	Military	Judiciary	Press	TV	Trade Unions	Police	Government	Parliament	Pol. parties	EU
Church	.476	.328	.221	.253	.316	.387	.397	.361	.283	.265
Military		.430	.276	.314	.353	.540	.379	.389	.324	.327
Judiciary			.455	.418	.386	.471	.576	.562	.515	.402
Press				.787	.522	.394	.399	.370	.424	.385
TV					.558	.433	.384	.391	.421	.403
Trade Unions						.528	.357	.347	.368	.311
Police							.484	.471	.418	.384
Government								.862	.704	.423
Parliament									.751	.429
Political parties										.453

Note: All coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

In 2010, the patterns of correlations are similar to those of 2004. We can see that there is a tendency of similar evaluation of some institutions. The evaluation of the Government and Parliament has the correlation .862, while the one between the political parties, Parliament and the Government exceeds .70, which means that people (as far as a noticeable level of trust is concerned), evaluate the Government, Parliament and political parties similarly. On the contrary, trust in the church has relatively low correlations with the evaluation of the press, TV, political parties or the EU. In the search for a pattern, we used a component analysis, just like for the data of 2004.

Table 15. Factor Analysis – rotated matrix of components for 2010

	Components			
	1	2	3	4
Church	.227	.075	.761	.049
Military	.163	.155	.803	.214
Judiciary	.567	.318	.336	.173
Press	.247	.856	.073	.161
TV	.228	.856	.112	.179
Trade Unions	.132	.714	.363	.095
Police	.255	.371	.607	.210
Government	.865	.165	.254	.162
Parliament	.882	.168	.220	.185
Political parties	.805	.242	.116	.242
EU	.261	.203	.148	.860
UN	.227	.165	.288	.869

Method of extraction: method of the main components; method of rotation: Varimax with Kaiser normalisation. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

With only slight deviations, there was a very similar component structure in 2010 as in 2004. The first component is trust in the Government, Parliament and political parties, and trust in the judiciary (which in 2004 was in another component) is now attached to this component. The second component consists again of the press, TV, and trades unions, but without the judiciary. The structures of the third and the fourth component are identical and have only changed places. The third component constitutes trust in uniforms, and the fourth in

international institutions. All the four components together explain 76.35% of the variance.

The following components were used to construct the scales:

1. In 2010 we started with all four scales (trust in the judiciary, the Government, political parties and Parliament). The construed scale's alpha is .888. However, if we remove the scale of trust in the judiciary then alpha increases to .912. Therefore, in the final version of the scale "trust in the Government", we have three elements. In such a way, the scale is different from the one we used under the same name in 2004, where we left out political parties and the judiciary.

2. In the second construction of the scale of trust in the media, we have kept trust in the press and in TV because by removing trade unions, alpha increases from .828 to .880.

3. The third scale reflects trust in uniforms. In 2004, we left out trust in the police because then alpha was higher. We have now decided to keep it because alpha does not increase above .722 by leaving out the police.

4. For the sake of comparability, we have kept the scale of trust in the EU.

e) Factors which affect trust in groups of institutions

The next step of our analysis was the response to the second and third hypothesis, namely that the social status affected trust in institutions and that trust was a reflection of a set of values. In order to answer this question, we used the multiple regression method where we analysed how indicators of the social status and various sets of value orientations (given below in the table on the construction of independent variables) were predictors of trust in various groups of institutions. We used the gradual regression method, and in Table 16, only the final results are given. In this table, we can see statistically significant predictors for each of the three construed scales of trust in groups of domestic institutions and in the European Union.

Table 16. Regression analysis of significant predictors (dependent variables) for each group of institutions (independent variables) 2004

<i>Scale of trust in the Government</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Scale of corruption	-.200	.000
Scale of patriotism	.113	.003
Attitudes towards sexual morality	.087	.027
Scale of political authoritarianism	.079	.046
R-Square	.091	
<i>Scale of trust in the media</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Scale of corruption	-.164	.000
Scale of political authoritarianism	.150	.000
Scale of authoritarianism	-.117	.002
R-Square	.053	
<i>Scale of trust in “uniforms”</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Scale of patriotism	.223	.000
Scale of sexual norms and abortion	.153	.000
Scale of interethnic relations	.124	.001
Scale of political authoritarianism	.084	.018
Scale of corruption	-.073	.026
Professions	-.088	.012
Scale of attitudes towards Trade Unions	-.074	.029
R-Square	.193	
<i>Scale of trust in the EU</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Scale of democratic qualities	-.122	-.122
Scale of corruption	-.086	-.086
Scale of modernism	.082	.082
Scale of sexual conservatism	-.088	-.088
Scale of privatisation	.076	.076
R-Square	.038	

In the case of trust in “uniforms”, the explained variance (R-Square) is almost 20% (19.3) which is, for social sciences, a satisfactory measure of the explained variance of the dependent variable along with the given independent variables. The other three dependent variables have a relatively small percentage of the explained variance with in-

dependent variables. Thus the trust in the EU is explained with only 3% of variance.

Therefore, other factors and their sets explain the remaining 97% of variance. As for the scale of trust in the media and in the Government, the percentages of the explained variance are only a little higher: in the first case 5% and in the second 9%.

We cannot say we have “explained” our independent variables because the percentage of the unexplained variance is much higher than the percentage of the explained variance. What we may analyse is the relative importance of different variables regarding the explanation of the part of the variance explained by our model. In Table 16 we have given only significant standardised coefficients (directly comparable and expressed as elements of standard deviations).

Sets of significant predictors vary from one dependent variable to the other which means that the trust in (group) institutions can be explained by different independent variables. The first hypothesis, that the trust in institutions is determined by the social status, does not apply and has not been confirmed, except in the case of the trust in “uniforms” where the professional position appears as a negative component in the explanation of the dependent variable (the higher the position on the scale of professions, the less trust in “uniforms”). In the explanation of other institutions (dependent variables), none of the used variables of the social-demographic-economic status appeared as significant.⁴ Indeed, only a higher occupational status results in less confidence in “uniforms”, but this effect is fairly small.

Consequently, a parallel conclusion that can be made is that the degree of trust in institutions depends on (or is a part of) a value system

⁴ Mishler and Rose (2001) came to similar results for a large number of Central and East-European post-communist countries. Their socio-economic variables showed very little connection with the trust in institutions. The only weak but statistically significant connection is the one with the place of residence whereby those who live in smaller places show a higher level of trust. In the case of Croatia, such a connection was not present. It is also worth mentioning that in the case of a number of developed countries, much more significant connections appear among variables such as the financial situation and/or education and trust in institutions (Freitag, 2003, Putnam 2000) and a question arises why, in post-communist countries there is no such connection which exists in a number of developed countries.

which is not derived from a socio-economic status. In attempting to find a correlation between socio-economic status and trust in institutions, excluding other value orientations, there are also no statistically significant coefficients (to save space, it is not shown). This means that the significance of values in “explaining” trust in institutions does not annul the initial correlations between socio-economic status and values such as nationalism (Sekulić, 2005). Therefore, trust in institutions depends on value orientations and not on objective facts determining socio-economic status.

Table 16 shows which value orientations or systems appear as significant determinants and so the trust in various groups of institutions depends on various value systems. The only element that appears in the systems of determinations for all groups of institutions is the perception of corruption.⁵ The more the respondents perceive corruption as widespread in Croatian society, the less is their trust in the “Government”, “uniforms” or “the media”. Interestingly enough, their trust in the European Union is then also lower. Indeed, the perception of corruption in Croatia minimises trust in all institutions, as well as in the European Union (the implied causality is established here arbitrarily because we believe that this is more plausible than saying that the lower trust in the European Union increases the perception of corruption in Croatia). It is obvious that respondents tend to generalise their experience in Croatia and apply it in the case of Europe. If Croatia is corrupt, then Europe is also. This corresponds to the presented mechanism in Anderson’s (1998) paper saying that the respondents evaluate the EU institutions according to their evaluations of domestic institutions. Having insufficient information regarding the European institutions, they simply come to a conclusion based on an analogy with domestic institutions.

Another value that appears as a determinant factor of trust in all groups of institutions (except for trust in the European Union) is political authoritarianism. Trust in domestic institutions is directly

⁵ On the importance of the perception of corruption for trust in institutions see also Stulhofer, 2004.

proportional to the value of political authoritarianism and this very fact reveals a very interesting mechanism. This trust in domestic institutions reflects some authoritarian inclinations by the respondents in the 2004 survey, however, authoritarianism does not appear as a determinant factor of trust in the European Union. Trust in the European Union, as opposed to the trust in domestic institutions, is not a result of political authoritarianism. This explains the conclusion that trust in the European Union really represented a separate component not linked with the same values as the trust in domestic institutions.

A careful analysis of the system of values conditioning trust in various groups of institutions shows that regardless of the fact that the set of determinants is different for each group of institutions, the content of the appearing values may be classified in wider subgroups, and such classification is a clear answer to the third hypothesis. The trust in the Government and the trust in “uniforms” are conditioned by a traditional and conservative system, while the trust in the European Union belongs to a modernist value system. If we analyse the positive determinants of trust in “uniforms”, we shall see that these are patriotism, sexual conservatism (being against abortion and pre-marital sexual relations), suspicion in the possibility of interethnic cooperation (the scale of interethnic relations) and political authoritarianism. We can thus say that the attitudes in the sphere of politics, interethnic relations and sex issues are conservative. A negative attitude towards trade unions must be added to this as well.

The trust in the Government is composed of a completely similar causal structure. The same two values appear as positive determinants: patriotism and political authoritarianism. Sexual conservatism may be added to this although in the form of another scale of sexual norms. In both cases, the predominant system of determination is nationalistic when it comes to patriotism, authoritarian when it comes to politics and traditionalistic when it comes to sexual issues.

The trust in the media has a significantly lower number of detected determinants. They actually point to a contradictory and a less profiled structure of determinants. The trust in the media is thus positively determined by political authoritarianism (like the trust in

the Government and in “uniforms”) but it is negatively determined by general authoritarianism. General authoritarianism, as we can see from the description of scales for this independent variable, probably reflects a deeper authoritarian personality structure (expressed as elements describing two types of people, weak and strong, as well as the statement that the most important thing for children is to obey their parents). This component also includes a general statement saying it is always bad for employees to have a say in the management (i.e. anti-self-management attitudes), and negative opinions about strikers who are nothing but lazybones. These general authoritarian attitudes are a separate component in relation to political authoritarianism which consists of the elements on freedom of speech, the roles of the media and of the judicial system. These two types of authoritarianism constitute separate components as is reflected by the fact that they inversely determined trust in the media. Politically authoritative persons express more trust in the media than persons who are generally authoritative. Public trust in the media cannot be unambiguously equated with general authoritarian values although such elements do exist.

Trust in the European Union suggested a different set of determinants. Modernism and support for privatisation appeared as positive determinants. None of the traditional-conservative values appeared as significant in determining the trust in domestic institutions. On the contrary, sexual conservatism (a traditional perception of the relations between genders) had a negative correlation with trust in the European Union. The same is the case with the scale of democratic quality but it is a mix of democratic and populist attitudes. Thus, one of its three elements is a component of anti-intellectualism, then anti-egalitarianism but also a positive attitude towards the media. Modernistic attitudes (observance of laws, support of trade unions) and the support of privatisation are the strongest determinants of the trust in the European Union.

The results for 2010 show that similar conclusions can be drawn as those for 2004. When interpreting the results, we must bear in mind that we do not deal with the same value scales. Although the scales diagnose a similar combination of traditionalism and conservatism

on the one hand, and modernism on the other, the questions are not entirely the same. Corruption is also measured in a completely different way (details can be seen in the appendix where the scales are described).

Table 17. Regression analysis of significant predictors (dependent variables) for each group of institutions (independent variables) 2010

<i>Scale of trust in the Government</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Index of gender authoritarian conservatism	.155	.001
Index of patriotic exclusivism	.261	.000
Index of political authoritarianism	.150	.001
Index of isolationism	-.115	.004
Perception of corruption	-.102	.005
R-Square	.156	
<i>Scale of trust in the media</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Index of patriotic exclusivism	.097	.046
Index of political authoritarianism	.141	.002
Index of sexual modernism	.101	.010
Education	.130	.016
Income	-.115	.004
Perception of corruption	-.102	.007
R-Square	.085	
<i>Scale of trust in "uniforms"</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Index of authoritarian statism	.287	.000
Index of patriotic exclusivism	.237	.000
Index of sexual modernism	-.131	.000
Perception of corruption	-.146	.000
R-Square	.217	
<i>Scale of trust in the EU</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Index of patriotic exclusivism	.160	.001
Index of political authoritarianism	.095	.045
Index of isolationism	-.137	.002
Index of national pride	.094	.021
Education	.127	.022
Perception of corruption	-.117	.003
R-Square	.053	

A comparative analysis of the obtained results suggests a somewhat larger percentage of the explanation of variance than in 2004, but we are still far from having explained the variance in our dependent variables. Now, relatively speaking, the highest percentage of variance has been explained with trust in “uniforms” (.217), and the lowest with trust in the EU (.053).

As in 2004, socio-economic status in 2010 does not, or only to a very small extent, explain the variance in trust in institutions. Not a single indicator of social-economic status is significant in explaining trust in the Government and in the media. In the case of trust in the EU, education plays a positive role, thus those with higher education have a tendency to have more trust in the EU. Trust in the media is connected with two key indicators of socio-economic status which operate in the opposite direction. Respondents with higher education have more trust in the media, but respondents with higher incomes have less trust. These indicators of socio-economic status were not significant predictors of trust in the media for 2004.

It seems that the increase of trust in these institutions described earlier has led to a situation where not only value orientations, but also social status, begin to explain the trust in them in the way described above. On the opposite scale, a relative decrease in trust in “uniforms” has led to the elimination of the negative impact of occupational position on trust which we observed in the data for 2004.

The perception of corruption in the 2010 survey (although measured differently in 2004) consistently proves to be a negative predictor of trust in institutions. The more widespread corruption is perceived to be, the lower the institutional trust. The same is the case with trust in the EU where the perception of corruption in Croatia also has a negative impact.

Generally speaking, value orientations suggest that traditionalism and conservatism increase trust in institutions, while progressive orientations decrease institutional trust. A very specific phenomenon in 2010 is a series of indices showing traditionalist and conservative values (index of patriotic exclusivism, political authoritarianism, national pride) which normally positively correlate with trust in domestic

institutions and appear here too as positive predictors. Logically, the index of isolationism correlates negatively with trust in the EU. Trust in the EU, which in 2004 correlated more with progressive values, now has become more widespread in 2010 with the result that trust in this institution has lost its “exclusive” progressive character. In 2010, a series of traditionalist value orientations correlate with trust in the EU, as opposed to 2004 when this was not the case. Education has become a positive predictor of trust in Europe in 2010. In the 2004 survey, education correlated negatively with traditionalist values. Contradictions appear with trust in the media. A large increase of the trust has led to an interesting new constellation of factors which correlate with trust. In 2004, we had a positive correlation of political authoritarianism and a negative correlation of general authoritarianism. Now we see a positive correlation of the index of political authoritarianism with trust in the media (of political exclusivism too), but also a positive correlation of the scale of progressiveness.

A change has occurred with trust in “uniforms”. A decrease in trust has led to a decrease of the number of predictive variables. Two value orientations have remained which positively correlate with trust in “uniforms”, and these are the indices of authoritarian statism and patriotic exclusivism. The index of sexual progressiveness and the perception of corruption show a negative correlation.

We may draw the conclusion that although the general pattern of determination has remained the same; the increase and decrease in trust have led to some shifts of determination. A decrease in trust in “uniforms” and an increase of trust in the media have caused a change in the structure of their determination. On the one hand, a relative decrease of trust in “uniforms” has additionally sharpened the conservative structure of determination factors. On the other hand, an increase of trust in the media has resulted in the “mixture” of determination, trust in the EU has expanded and become less the preserve of modernists. The perception of corruption clearly destroys trust in other institutions.

4. Conclusion

The analysis of the 2004 and 2010 public surveys in Croatia demonstrates that trust in institutions varies and is highest in the military, the church and the police in both surveys. The degree of trust in the European Union is at the level of average trust in domestic institutions. In this respect, the Croatian public's patterns of trust in institutions do not show any drastic discrepancy from the patterns in other European countries. We have not found any traces of greater enthusiasm or immense trust but also no significant lack of trust either. A principal component structure of trust shows that it can be structured in four basic components whereby the trust in the European Union (together with the trust in the UN) constitutes a separate component.

Contrary to expected results, trust in institutions is not determined by social status but reflects the values of the respondents. A high level of trust in the European Union was reflective of democratic and modernistic values in 2004. This modernistic dimension is diminished with the increase of trust in 2010. Trust in domestic institutions is much more determined by conservative and traditional values. People who are prone to traditionalism and conservatism have a tendency to express more trust in domestic institutions.

In 2010, significant changes have taken place when compared with 2004. Although the rankings have not changed significantly, it is clear that trust in some institutions has decreased, and increased in others. Thus the biggest relative losers are the church, the Government and Parliament, and the biggest winners are the media, primarily the press.

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Appendix:

1. Formation of value orientation scales in 2004 from the following attitudes-questions:

Scale of egalitarianism (alpha=.793)

Differences in the salaries in Croatia are too large.

The Government should reduce the difference in the salaries of those with large and those with small salaries.

The Government should provide jobs for those who want to work.

The Government should guarantee the minimum life standard to all.

The State should intervene in economy in order to diminish inequalities and protect the poor and the weak.

The State should intervene in economy to protect private entrepreneurs, capital investments and prevent strikes.

People should earn enough for a decent life regardless of what they do.

Scale of sexual conservatism (alpha=.816)

If in a marriage only one spouse is employed, it is more natural that it is the man.

Most household jobs are by their nature more suitable for women.

It is good that women and men are equal in marriage but the best thing is when the man has the final say.

It is natural for a woman to do the housework and for a man to work outside the house.

Scale of support to privatisation (alpha=.735)

Social progress will always be based on private ownership.

Privatisation works in theory but not in practice.

The Government should not control, regulate or in any other way interfere in private companies.

Without privatisation, companies would have been in a much worse situation than today.

Many public services would function better were they privatised.

Scale of patriotism (alpha=.770)

The survival of our nation is the task of each of us.
Every person has what he or she needs if the country is strong.
A nation without a leader is like a human being without the head.
Common national origin is a precondition for unity.

Scale of democratic quality (alpha=.565)

Independent media are essential for the development of democracy.
Some intellectuals by their quibbling only create confusion and chaos among people.
Levelling of wages is unjust because people's capabilities are different.

Scale of political authoritarianism (alpha=.695)

Full freedom of speech in society today leads to its total disintegration.
The judiciary must, after all, serve those in power.
The media should have more understanding for those in power.
The media which do not take into account national interests must be banned.
It is the best when the State and the courts are controlled by the same group of people.

Scale of trade unionism (alpha=.690)

We need better and stronger Trade Unions than those existing now.
It would be good to have again some form of workers' participation in management.
Workers can best fight for their rights by organising strikes.
If there were no Trade Unions, workers would be completely unprotected.
Companies would never increase salaries if there were no strikes.

Evaluation of corruption (alpha=.838)

Here it was important how many fellow-citizens did the same and there were four grades of the possible response: from 1 (almost nobody) to 4 (almost all).

Ask for compensation or benefits from the State to which he or she is not entitled.

Cheat with taxes if it is possible.

Give bribes for different services to avoid the payment of taxes.

Lie in his or her personal interest.

Scale of sexual norms (alpha=.684)

Abortion must be prohibited by law.

It is not OK for unmarried couples to live together.

Divorce should be prohibited by law.

Homosexuals are no better than criminals and must be severely punished.

Scale of interethnic relations (ethnocentrism) (alpha=.710)

Mixed marriages are always more unstable than others.

A person can feel completely safe when living in a place where most people are of the same nationality.

You can develop cooperation among different nations but not full trust.

Scale of sexual norms II (alpha=.620)

(The respondents were asked whether some situations were right or wrong. There were four possible grades of responses: from 1 (always right) to 4 (always wrong).

Do you consider it as right or wrong that a man and a woman have a sexual intercourse before marriage?

What is your opinion of a married person having a sexual relationship with a person other than his or her spouse?

What do you think of a sexual relationship between two adults of the same gender?

Do you approve of abortion if there is a high possibility that the child will be born with some malformation?

Do you approve of abortion if it is a family with very low income which cannot afford another child?

If someone from another family killed your family member and the authorities don't do anything, is it correct to take personal revenge outside the law?

Scale of modernism (alpha=.583)

Workers need strong Trade Unions in order to protect their working conditions and salaries.

Law should be observed regardless of everything else.

Political parties aimed at destroying democracy should be banned.

Scale of general authoritarianism (alpha=.310)

There are two kinds of people in the world, weak and strong.

The most important thing is that children obey their parents.

It is never good that employees have any voting rights in the management of a company.

Strikers are lazybones and idlers.

2. Formation of scales in 2010 from the following questions

Scale of authoritarian statism (alpha=.886)

Family care is the basic task of every state.

Every people must have its own state.

We all need a strong state.

The main task of a state is to ensure order.

The past of our people must be the holy of holies for every Croat.

A multiparty system guarantees the expression of interests of all social groups.

Without a leader a people is like a man with no head.

The achievement of social justice is the goal of every state.

Every inch of our country must be a holy to all of us.

Scale of gender authoritarianism (alpha=.838)

If in a marriage only one spouse is employed, it is more natural that this be the man.

Most chores in the household by their nature suit women.

Mixed marriages must be more unstable than others.

It is good that in marriage the spouses are equal but it is better when the man's word is final.

Men prefer public and women private activities.

Collective interests must always be more important than those of an individual.

Nowadays total freedom of speech leads to society's disorganisation.

Children's upbringing is more the mother's than the father's duty.

One must listen to one's superiors even when they are wrong.

All in all, family life suffers if the wife works full time.

It is almost certainly a source of problems when the wife earns more than the husband.

Scale of authoritarian national traditionalism (alpha=.783)

It is possible to develop cooperation among nations, but not complete trust.

There are two main kinds of people in the world, the weak and the strong.

The most important thing is to teach children to obey their parents.

The common origin of our people is the foundation of our trust.

We must not have too much confidence in foreigners.

A people which does not nurture its traditions deserves to fail.

Scale of patriotic exclusivism (alpha=.753)

After a century of exploitation we finally have an opportunity to live as a rich people.

By fighting for our state we have also won our dignity as a nation.

I prefer to be a citizen of Croatia rather than of any other country in the world.

The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Croatians.

People must support their own country even when it is in the wrong.

Scale of sexual relations (alpha=.598)

Homosexuals are no better than criminals and must be most severely punished (negative loading).

It is acceptable if a couple lives together without wanting to get married.

Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple cannot solve their problems in marriage.

Abortion must be prohibited by law (negative loading).

People must develop their own standards of good and evil and pay less attention to the Bible and to old and traditional forms of ethics.

Homosexuals who are in long-term relationships should be entitled to enter into marriage.

Scale of isolationism (alpha=.632)

Croatia should follow its own interests even when they lead to conflicts with other nations.

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Croatia.

Large international companies do more and more harm to Croatian domestic companies.

Scale of political authoritarianism (alpha=.596)

The judiciary must ultimately serve the government.

One can feel safe only when living in a community where most members are of the same nationality.

Scale of treat coming from the world (alpha=.624)

Increased exposure to foreign films, music and literature is harmful to our national and local culture.

International organisations deprive Croatia of too many powers.

Scale of private ownership orientation (alpha=.592)

Social progress will always be based on private ownership.

Only private agricultural production ensures better supplies.

The less the state is involved in the economy, the better the economy.

Scale of national lack of pride (alpha=.699)

There are some things in Croatia which make me ashamed of being its citizen.

I am often less proud of Croatia than I would want to be.

Perception of corruption

This was examined in only one question: How widespread do you believe bribery and corruption are among civil servants in Croatia?

Almost no civil servant is involved.

Only a few are involved.

Most are involved.
Almost all are involved.

3. Formation of scales of the socio-demographic-economic status

Occupation:

- 1=farmer
- 2=low-skilled (*NKV*) and semi-skilled (*PKV*) workers
- 3=skilled (*KV*), highly skilled (*VKV*) workers, foremen
- 4=self-employed
- 5=clerks and technicians
- 6=experts
- 7=managers, entrepreneurs, politicians

Education

- 1=primary school and lower
- 2=3-year vocational schools
- 3=grammar and secondary schools
- 4=two-year college
- 5=university education

Place of residence

- 1=family farms, hamlets
- 2=villages of less than 200 inhabitants
- 3=villages of 200-999 inhabitants
- 4=small towns of 1000-9.999 inhabitants
- 5=smaller towns of 10.000-49.999 inhabitants
- 6=medium towns of 50.000-99.999 inhabitants
- 7=large towns of more than 100.000
- 8=capitals

Income

2004: 17 variable categories of 0 HRK household income in the previous month of up to HRK 15,001.

2010: Classes of HRK 3000 from the lowest 0 amount to HRK 3,000 to the highest of more than HRK 15,000.